So Stalin more or less was responsible for killing about 20 million of his countrymen, while "inconveniencing" another 20 million, according to Roy Medvedev from Britannica.com
In 1989 the Soviet historian Roy Medvedev estimated that about 20 million died as a result of the labour camps, forced collectivization, famine, and executions. Another 20 million were victims of imprisonment, exile, and forced relocation.
Whatever the actual number is, I really don't care to argue about that. What I wonder is whether or not his policies that brought about so many deaths were necessary in modernizing Russia's economy and increasing its industrial capacity in order to gear up for war. Also given that his massive purges didn't really help in the beginning, how responsible are his modernization policies for saving the Soviet Union by significantly aiding in the defeat of the Germans?
In what way was the Russia economy and modernised? By how much (and what measurement are you using) was Russia's industrial capacity increased during this period.
How would (human considerations aside) losing 40mio of the workforce help boost the economy, let alone be necessary?
In what ways did Stalin gear up for war? Do you think losing 40mio potential soldiers (including many experienced militiary leaders) helped?
The massive purges that didn't really help in the beginning. Are you suggesting they helped in the end? Are you suggesting that the purges ultimately helped the Russian war effort. How and why?
Finally, the modernisation policies that saved Russia and helped defeat the Nazi's. What were they?
1) In what way was the Russia economy and modernised?
2) By how much (and what measurement are you using) was Russia's industrial capacity increased during this period.
3) How would (human considerations aside) losing 40mio of the workforce help boost the economy, let alone be necessary?
4) In what ways did Stalin gear up for war? Do you think losing 40mio potential soldiers (including many experienced militiary leaders) helped?
5) The massive purges that didn't really help in the beginning. Are you suggesting they helped in the end? Are you suggesting that the purges ultimately helped the Russian war effort. How and why?
6) Finally, the modernisation policies that saved Russia and helped defeat the Nazi's. What were they?
1) Was the Russian economy modernized? I'm going to lump this into #6
2) IC measurement? lol, can we use Hearts of Iron 3? (I seriously wonder how they come up with such numbers). I remember a chart my History Professor drew a few years ago showing the Russia's industrial capacity or "strength" pretty much flatlining. He cited someone who's name I cannot recall. Would you happen to know anything about this?
3) Those 40 million weren't all of military age, and it's hard to determine which age groups were hit hardest, so let's assume the too young and too old for military service were the biggest amounts since they're most vulnerable or the weakest. Also, I should've included the link to that quote here. It states that of those 40 million:
n 1989 the Soviet historian Roy Medvedev estimated that about 20 million died as a result of the labour camps, forced collectivization, famine, and executions. Another 20 million were victims of imprisonment, exile, and forced relocation.
. So if a large number died in labour camps, then they were contributing to the economy, though to what degree is hard to determine. Forced collectivization.. Perhaps some were contributing to the economy, until they were to weak to continue and died, so that small amount can be counted, but it's really hard to say. Famine and executions were definitely not too helpful, but unfortunately all of the causes of death are lumped into one number, so it's hard to determine how many contributed and how many didn't contribute. The other 20 million victims of imprisonment... we got imprisonment, so we can assume that amount isn't going to contribute even if they're sentence is a short one, unless they're sent to labour camps--ah, then they contribute to all that is great to Mother Russia... Exile isn't helpful, but forced relocation may not be too bad, they're just being moved. Also, the 20 million victims of these causes can also be included in the 20 million who died, so it can't total 40 million; however, who knows what the real number may be. Also, we do have to keep in mind that many (who knows the real numbers) that were killed, exiled, relocated, imprisoned, and/or interned in prison camps were not suitable for conscription since they were foreigners, and many were minorities, but I have no idea whether those minorities would have fought for "Mother" Russia.
4) Well, they weren't all 40 million potential soldiers, and the total wasn't 40 million, however we really don't know the actual numbers, so that is what it is. The actual potential manpool that could've been recruited is hard to determine, but considering what I've said previously, it can't be nearly as high as the the number of the more vulnerable and/or politically unreliable ones who didn't make the draft. I'd say the numbers that slipped through service in the Red Army weren't too significant to really affect much. As for gearing up for war, that would include any wars and conflicts against others before fighting Germany (Finland, Japan, Poland) and the lessons learned from them, it would also include investing heavily in the arms industry and R&D, increasing conscription, and whatever other means authoritarian countries can use in order to gear up, or prepare, for war.
5) In the beginning they didn't help, but the Russians still won regardless of how detrimental those purges were. I'm not trying to imply they were necessary, but its a factor that doesn't focus on the main point of my question which... (see below)
6) ( ) Sorry, I'm working on this one right now, please give me by tonight or by tomorrow or the next day.
The Five Year Plans: Focused on heavy industry, centralizing the economy, nationalizing small industry and services. Also the collectivization program.
Let's go with this:
By 1932 Stalin realized that both the economy and society were under serious strain. Although industry failed to meet its production targets and agriculture actually lost ground in comparison with 1928 yields, Stalin declared that the First Five-Year Plan had successfully met its goals in four years. He then proceeded to set more realistic goals. Under the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-37), the state devoted attention to consumer goods, and the factories built under the first plan helped increase industrial output in general. The Third Five-Year Plan, begun in 1938, produced poorer results because of a sudden shift of emphasis to armaments production in response to the worsening international climate. In general, however, the Soviet economy had become industrialized by the end of the 1930s. Agriculture, which had been exploited to finance the industrialization drive, continued to show poor returns throughout the decade.
But aside from this, from the general WW2 books I've read on this, they all mention that Russia undergone an modernisation program that greatly industrialized Russia in a relatively short amount of time.
So back to the main question: how responsible are his modernization policies for saving the Soviet Union by significantly aiding in the defeat of the Germans?
What I'm also wanting to get it is if the answer is more or less "yes," then wouldn't that justify the deaths of the 20 million dead, and the 20 others imprisoned, exiled, and what not?
Well Stalin did modernise Russian industry in the early parts of his leadership. He wanted to catch up with the big western states which had flown ahead with WWI and the intervening years, and the quickety way to do this was to invest in heavy industry. A lot of this was done through pure force by making factories convert, people work and determining what happened when, but it actually helped them to win the war. Another stroke of genius (or pure luck) was that large quantities of these factories were placed in or behind the Urals, which turned out to be the perfect place for construction to repel the advancing German forces.
His policies killed tens of millions, but the ultimate answer is that without his extreme measures it is a very real possibility that the USSR may have lost, or at least been pegged back much further (losing Moscow, Stalingrad, Caucasia) which would have made the war last much longer and given the allies a heck of a lot more work to do after the Normandy invasion. Thats my take on it anyway from what I've read/heard/seen.
The Five Year Plans were an important part of the Stalinist model. The plans began after Stalin had almost consolidated his power in 1928. He quickly pushed for radical economic change and wiped out the old system of the NEP, introduced by his predecessor Lenin. This new system affected the lives of Soviet citizens and the country and when assessing the successfulness of the Five Year Plans many factors need to be taken into consideration. Stalin’s aims were to achieve socialism in one country by modernising the Soviet Union through rapid industrialisation in order to catch up with Western rivals. On the surface, the Five Year Plans can be viewed as a success, entire cities emerged out of nowhere, industrialisation and progress spread rapidly and there was a feeling of nationalist pride that emerged and spread across the entire USSR, something the country had not felt in a long time, after a string of failed international wars, such as the First World War and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. However, these feelings were for the most part induced by propaganda and rapid industrialisation came at a deep social cost; terrible famines hit the USSR causing many people to starve to death and between the years 1932-1933 the entire economy was severely overstrained and almost reached a complete collapse. The concept of Stalin’s Five Year Plan emerged in the years 1928-1929 when a “state-sponsored drive for ‘modernity’ of unprecedented violence, scope and pace,” was launched. There were many motives for this push towards modernity. These included the perceived threat from Western countries like the UK and France who had intervened during the Civil War on the side of the nationalists. There was also the problem of the rise of the right-wing political parties in other countries. Mussolini during this period was consolidating his power, whilst Nazi power in Germany was slowly but surely rising. According to McCauley, there was “the fear of foreign economic intervention.” Stalin also used the threat of a conspiracy involving Shakhty engineers as a scare tactic against the people therefore giving him leeway to suggest industrial reforms. Stalin fabricated charges against alleged conspirators such as sabotage and counterespionage dating back to the 1920s and partially used the trial as part of his basis for radicalising the economic policy. Chubarov is particularly critical of the conspiracy of the Shakhty engineers in Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity and argues that it is “beyond doubt that the whole affair was fabricated by Stalin’s secret police,” and “Stalin used it to infuse the political life with elements of social confrontation to drum up support for his radical economic measures.” This implies that Stalin used political intrigue and propaganda to secure support for industrialisation. However, as Geoffrey Hosking rightly points out in his book A History of the Soviet Union “one myth turned out not to be a myth: that was the ‘imperialist threat’. In 1941 that became reality in no uncertain fashion.” Evan Mawdsley in The Stalin Years argues that “industrialisation came from the Russian Communists’ general mistrust of the outside world, and not just from a fear of specific enemies.” In this respect the rapid industrialisation that Stalin pushed for paid off when the Soviet Union was plunged into war after Hitler invaded. One could argue however that the threat in 1928, when the idea for the Five Year Plans was constructed, was minimal and at that time there wasn’t such an impetus and need for such rapid industrialisation, as it came at a deep social cost. If one is to analyse the Five Year Plans on the raw surface and examine the statistics, it is clear that remarkable success and progress was achieved. Stalin’s promise to undo the USSR’s backwardness and catch the country up with the rest of the developed nations also seemed completely plausible. This success in industrialisation is highlighted by Martin McCauley in his book ‘Stalin and Stalinism’ when the author states: “The first FYP was a period of genuine enthusiasm, and prodigious achievements were recorded in production.” McCauley also highlights that even though many of the targets were ridiculously high and virtually impossible, they “galvanised people into action, and more was achieved than would have been the case had orthodox advice been followed.” The accomplishment of the first Five Year Plan is highlighted by the fact that coal production rose from 35.4 tons a year to 75 million tons a year and iron ore production rose from 5.7 million tons to 19 million tons. Meanwhile, light industry expanded by 70% and national income rose by 103%. These figures show vast increases over a period of five year years, which can be viewed as phenomenal. Stalin used propaganda highly effectively during the first Five Year Plan in order to inspire people. Alec Nove highlights this in his book An Economic History of the Soviet Union when he tells the story of Magnitogorsk, which was a new metallurgical centre, which was built in the middle of a wilderness. Nove states that “workers and technicians worked under the most primitive of conditions, yet many seemed to have been fired by a real faith in the future and in their own and their children’s part in it.” The emergence of new cities and metallurgical centres was not uncommon. This is illustrated in Chris Ward’s Stalin’s Russia when the author states the fact that during the first Five Year Plan, “in the Urals, the Kuzbass, the Volga district and the Ukraine hundreds of mining, engineering and metallurgical enterprises were in the making.” This demonstrates the total restructure of the Soviet Union that took place during the First Five Year Plan. One could possibly argue however that the Stalinist system was not strictly fully responsible for the successes of the Five Year Plans. This argument is made by Evan Mawdsley in his book The Stalin Years when the author brings up the valid point that “high levels of production and growth were achieved because Russia was an enormous country with rich natural resources. It was not an economic blank slate.” The author also highlights the fact that “Industrialisation, especially the initial ‘take-off’, owed much more than was publicly admitted to outside technology.” Examples of this include the Stalingrad Tractor Factory, which was built to American and British plans. This therefore implies that the success in rapid industrialisation that the Five Year Plans produced had a number of causes and was not totally due to the Stalinist model. However, Suny in his book The Soviet Experiment highlights that Stalin did in fact know about the importance of human motivation and this was illustrated in his November 1929 article The Year of the Great Breakthrough where “Stalin spoke of human will as the essential force for achieving the economic plan.” It is possible to argue that the first Five Year Plan was not in fact a success and the Stalinist model actually brought more negatives than positives. Despite the numerous industrial positives that the First Five Year Plan brought to the USSR, there is as always another side to the coin. Geoffrey Hosking highlights this when he states “the first Five Year Plan left conspicuous imbalances.” This is evident by the fact that there was so much focus on heavy industry that other industries declined during the period. This included the chemical industry and the textile industry, which Hosking states “actually declined during the first Five Year Plan, which meant that clothes were of poor quality and in very short supply.” Other industries like railway and the consumer industry were almost completely neglected, whilst desperately needed food supplies were interrupted by the collectivisation process. This brought terrible famines and stagnation to the region. The Five Year Plans are criticised also for having no proper structure. This is argued by Chris Ward when he states that “the planned economy was, in crucial respects, plan less.” The organisation Gosplan was technically put in charge of organising the Five Year Plans but it was not in fact the omnipotent organisation that it was believed to be in the West and instead was made up of mainly second-rank employees. Stalin kept a close eye on the organisation and purged its members in 1930 in order to keep those within it on guard. This is argued by Hosking when he states that “planning became a matter not of prediction but of command.” This point is also raised by Suny who states that “Stalin’s command economy was hierarchal, with those above issuing orders and expecting obedience from those below,” and “coercion operated on every level.” This meant that Stalin had complete control to just change the shape of the plans whenever he felt it necessary. This organisation highlights a difference between Stalinism and Marxism as instead of the state being absorbed into society as proposed by Marxism, the system of Stalinism actually resulted in society being taken over by the State. Chubarov builds on these points when he states: “In reality the pseudo-democratic façade of ‘victorious socialism’ masked a system in which the state exercised unlimited control, from politics to the economy.” This suggests that power actually was held in the hands of the few rather than the many and this clustering of power arguably helped produce imbalances and problems during the plan. By 1933, the end of the first Five Year Plan, the country was in a deep financial crisis. This is highlighted by Chris Ward in Stalin’s Russia when the author states: “Breakneck industrialization caused enormous social strains, and vast economic dislocations, so much so that in 1932-3 the entire experiment seemed on the verge of collapse.” Roy Medvedev in his book Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism is particularly critical of the Soviet Union’s attempts at reform and modernisation. He blames Stalin in particular for the failings to reach targets and argues that “the first five-year plan proceeded at a slower pace and higher price not least of all because Stalin was the head of the party and the government.” However, he does concede that there were some successes in the first Five Year Plan but believes that Stalin “often acted not as a wise statesman but a voluntarist and promoter of unrealizable schemes.” This therefore suggests that although the first two Five Year Plans can be viewed as a success, the Stalinist model actually hindered the success and external factors such as the vastness of the Soviet Union and the sheer amount of people power played a bigger role. One could argue however, that Medvedev is particularly critical about Stalin and his role in the Five Year Plans due to the political climate that he was writing in. Medvedev published his first edition of his book in 1969, when the Soviet Union at the time was attempting to rehabilitate Stalin and this resulted in him being thrown out of the Communist party and often arrested and intimidated by KGB agents. One could therefore argue that Medvedev wanted to make a particularly strong statement and therefore is critical in regards to every aspect of Stalin’s dictatorship, including his role in industrialisation. One could also argue that the rapid industrialisation was damaging to the environment and this argument is put forward by Suny when the author states “The rush to modernity, with its celebration of smokestack industry and mammoth hydroelectric dams, meant that attention was paid almost exclusively to output and productivity and almost no notice was taken to the impact of rapid industrialization and the natural environment.” Suny is critical of this aspect of the Five Year Plans and highlights that “Soviet Union general ecological ignorance was compounded by the bravado of Communists who looked upon nature simply as an obstacle to be overcome on the road to progress.” However, it can be argued that some ecological damage was completely unavoidable in any form of rapid industrialisation. The First Five Year Plan was in particular a tough period for the Soviet Union. This is partly due to a poor yield of crops, which resulted in a terrible famine. This famine was arguably made worse by dekulakisation and collectivisation, which was one of the aims of the plan. When the state attempted to collect grain and push the peasants into collective farms rather than private farms, there was a furious backlash. Instead of giving away the grain, some kulaks simply burned it instead and slaughtered their animals as well. As Trotsky states in The Revolution Betrayed “the most devastating hurricane hit the animal kingdom. The number of horses fell 55 per cent... the number of horned cattle fell from 30.7 million to 19.5million,” between the years 1929 and 1934. In response, the Soviet officials tortured the kulaks, exiled them and killed them and by 1930 the class had been virtually liquidated. However, serious damage had been done to agriculture and many people therefore could not get food or basic supplies. This made Stalin call a halt to the campaign of collectivisation and argued that local officials had become “dizzy with success.” It is predicted that the number of deaths during this period from starvation was 7.2-8.1 million. One party activist, Lev Kopelev from the period states “We were performing our revolutionary duty. We were obtaining grain for the socialist fatherland. For the Five Year Plan.” This poignant quote highlights that collectivisation was an important part of the first Five Year Plan. Robert Conquest in The Harvest of Sorrow is particularly negative about the process of collectivisation and emphasises there was “Not a superior agriculture. Not a contented peasantry,” and actually “agricultural production had been vastly reduced,” and hence the process of collectivisation didn’t really help the progress of the Five Year Plans, even if the two revolutions, one in agriculture and one in industry were intertwined. Conquest goes on to state: “A whole way of life had been destroyed and replaced by one felt to be vastly inferior.” This is a strong statement and one with factual backing when the author highlights that approximately 14.5 million peasants died from dekulakisation and famine. Although statistics regarding the amount of deaths were not mentioned by the press at the time, the sheer number means that it is hard to really describe the Five Year Plans as a success. One could however argue that Conquest wrote his book before the fall of the Soviet Union opening of the archives and that is therefore a limitation of his source and since 1989 there have in fact been more revisionist interpretations. These include those of Robert Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft who reject the belief that the Stalinist model deliberately imposed famine in order to crush the problem of Ukrainian nationalism, which Stalin perceived as a hindrance to agricultural production. These authors accept the belief that collectivisation on the whole brought more negatives than positives to the Soviet Union but feel that Conquest is too scathing in his attacks and his figures are also over-estimated. Evan Mawdsley also highlights that the process of collectivisation ironically did provide some benefits towards the Five Year Plans and furthered the State’s economic goals by helping to “provide an abundant labour supply, as peasants left the difficult conditions of the countryside to seek relatively better conditions on the building sites and in the factories.” After the first five years had passed, it seemed from a national perspective that what had been achieved could not be repeated. However, Stalin pressed on and issued a second Five Year Plan during 1933-37, even if the new targets were slightly more modest than the ones that were set in the first Five Year Plan. The second Five Year Plan can be viewed as a completely different experience to the first one. Stalin had arguably learned from his mistakes from the first Five Year Plan where there had been somewhat of a failure in planning and setting realistic targets. This is evident when McCauley highlights that “The second FYP was over-fulfilled, in general, by 3 per cent.” There was also an increase involvement in consumer industries, which had been neglected during the first Five Year Plan. Orlando Figes in The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia highlights that “by the middle of the 1930s, the supply of foodstuffs, clothes and household goods had markedly improved.” This suggests again that lessons had been learned. There were also improvements in technical education. During the first Five Year Plan, many schools in the country were closed with even talk of “‘withering away of the school’ altogether.” However, during the second Five Year Plan there was an increase in skilled learning and “workers were encouraged to take part-time courses in apprenticeship schools, to increase their qualifications.” However, other tactics used to achieve the targets for the second Five Year Plan can be viewed as being more controversial. During the Second Five Year Plan, Stalin once again used propaganda effectively to improve morale and hence make people work harder and this is best illustrated by the Stakhanovite Movement. Alexey Stakhanov was the most famous of all the Heroes of the Soviet Union. His fame began after a session in 1935 where he was reported to have mined 102 tonnes of coal in 5 hours and 45 minutes, which was 13 times his average quota. It was however later reported that this was fallacy about what he did mine and that he had a team of helpers doing the core work. However, during the period the myth of Stakhanov was still highly effective and many Soviet workers aspired to be like him in order to attempt to achieve the fame that he had achieved. This is evident by the fact that there were rumours around the time that Stakhanov’s record was broken by other miners, one who supposedly mined 115 tonnes and another who mined 119 tonnes. The idea that there were these supermen like figures, mining so much coal may not have been truly realistic but it is undoubted that they helped inspire other Soviet workers into working that hard. The Stakhanov movement can therefore be viewed as one of the successes of the Five Year Plans. The second five year plan can be commended by the fact that the targets made were more modest and realistic. The second plan can also be viewed as much more successful than the first due to the fact that the hard work in organising the industrialisation had taken place, and the second plan was therefore just an effective way of continuing of what had been achieved during the First Plan. However, when analysing the second Five Year Plan, one must examine the terror and fear that accompanied it. Stalin used a tactic described as ‘specialist baiting,’ which originated after the conspiracy of the Shakhty workers. Anyone who seemed to be against the Five Year Plans was accused of sabotage and was ex-communicated as a result of this. Stalin also used an element of forced labour in order to push through his plans. Ward highlights that “de-kulakized peasants and others were forced to toil alongside free workers or in the NKVD’s sprawling empire of prison camps.” Wheatcroft makes an estimate that the amount of people who worked in slave labour was almost “seven million on the eve of the German invasion, or about eight per cent of the entire labour force.” The fact that Stalin had to use slave labour to such an extent implies that the first two Five Year Plans were not as successful as one would first think due to the fact that they were only achieved through terror and serfdom. The extreme measures that Stalin made in order to push forward his plans is further highlighted by Alec Nove when he writes about the 1932-33 crisis. This is emphasised by an amendment made by Stalin to the Article 58 of the Criminal Code, which now stated that pilfering on railways and of kolkhoz property was now to be punished “by the maximum means of social defence, shooting, or, in case of extenuating circumstances, deprivation of freedom for not less than ten years, with confiscation of all property.” This highlights the fact that these were dangerous times for Soviet citizens. Although, there was supposedly a period of three good years after the crisis of 1932-1933, this did little to enhance life or living standards for the workers. Chris Ward agrees and argues they “did nothing to improve matters; indeed housing conditions seem to have deteriorated as the decade wore on.” This puts further backing to the argument that the industrial revolution brought very few improvements to those that were doing most of the work in bringing it about. However, despite the workforce being plagued with fatigue and death, Stalin pushed on and this is evident by his call to Managers in 1931 when he stated ‘The pace must not be slackened! On the contrary, we must quicken it. We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years.’ This quote highlights the sheer determination that Stalin had behind his reforms and that industrialisation would be worth it regardless of the social cost and deaths that came alongside it. Overall, it is hard to fully ascertain Stalin’s success as a moderniser of the economy. ‘Catch up and overtake’ was the motto of Stalinism and one would certainly be justified in stating that during the first two Five Year Plans the USSR caught up with the rest of the world in terms of modernity and technology. However when examining the bigger picture of the Stalinist model, it is clear that the Five Year Plans failed in improving living standards for Soviet citizens compared to other Western countries. This is evident by the fact that due to the sheer advancement and focus on heavy industry, other industries like the consumer industry and textile industry were neglected. However, one could argue that to improve living conditions was never actually an aim of Stalin and the Stalinist model, and in this respect the first two Five Year Plans can therefore be viewed as a success. However, despite the plans being viewed as a success in Stalin’s eyes, in a grander scheme of things it is hard to describe the plans as successful when they came with such deep social consequences. Alexander Chubarov highlights in Russia’s bitter path to modernity that the Five Year Plans were achieved in part through the creation of “an ideological dictatorship, propped by mass terror, the leader’s cult, and invoking of the enemy image.” The fact therefore that there was an element of terror involved, although the great terror began truly after the completion of the second five year plan, therefore suggests that one can’t truly consider the Five Year Plans as a success of Stalinism. However, if one was to pick out one aspect of Stalinism that could be considered successful at all, it would be the rapid industrialisation that took place thanks to the Five Year Plans, which put them in a much better position when the Germans invaded in June of 1941.
Bibliography: Chubarov, Alexander, Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001) Conquest, Robert, The Harvest of Sorrow (Trowbridge: Century Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1986) Figes, Orlando, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia (London: Penguin, 2008) Hosking, Geoffrey, A History of the Soviet Union: Revised Edition (London: Fontana Press, 1990) Lewin, Moshe, The Soviet Century (London: Verso, 2005) Mawdsley, Evan, The Stalin Years (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) McCauley, Martin, Stalin and Stalinism (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2008) McCauley, Martin, The Soviet Union 1917-1991 (New York: Longman Group, 1993) McDermott, Kevin, Stalin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) Medvedev, Roy, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) Moynahan, Brian, The Russian Century (London: Seven Dials, 1999) Nove, Alec, An Economic History of the Soviet Union (London: Penguin Books Inc., 1969) Nove, Alec, The Soviet Economic System (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) Service, Robert, A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin (London: Penguin, 2003) Suny, Ronald, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, The USSR, and the Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) Trotsky, Leon, The Revolution Betrayed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972) Ward, Chris, Stalin’s Russia (New York: Routledge, 1993)
Thought you should know I wrote 'specialist baiting' in that essay purely for the lolz of using the word baiting, I am weird like that and actually got penalised for it with my tutor writing elaborate please on that point.
BigBallinStalin wrote:So Stalin more or less was responsible for killing about 20 million of his countrymen, while "inconveniencing" another 20 million, according to Roy Medvedev from Britannica.com
In 1989 the Soviet historian Roy Medvedev estimated that about 20 million died as a result of the labour camps, forced collectivization, famine, and executions. Another 20 million were victims of imprisonment, exile, and forced relocation.
Whatever the actual number is, I really don't care to argue about that. What I wonder is whether or not his policies that brought about so many deaths were necessary in modernizing Russia's economy and increasing its industrial capacity in order to gear up for war. Also given that his massive purges didn't really help in the beginning, how responsible are his modernization policies for saving the Soviet Union by significantly aiding in the defeat of the Germans?
Socialism sounds pretty cool so far. How did it all end?
BigBallinStalin wrote: Whatever the actual number is, I really don't care to argue about that. What I wonder is whether or not his policies that brought about so many deaths were necessary in modernizing Russia's economy and increasing its industrial capacity in order to gear up for war. Also given that his massive purges didn't really help in the beginning, how responsible are his modernization policies for saving the Soviet Union by significantly aiding in the defeat of the Germans?
Are you frikin' kiding me?May I ask you where are you from?I see that your curent location isTaiwan.I'm asking to see if you experimented the "benefits" of comunism.Because to be entitle to ask a question like this you need to have the experience of the "socialist dream"
P.S. I lived the firs 10 years of my life in the "comunist paradise"
Proud member of XiGames Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate.Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond measure
BigBallinStalin wrote: Whatever the actual number is, I really don't care to argue about that. What I wonder is whether or not his policies that brought about so many deaths were necessary in modernizing Russia's economy and increasing its industrial capacity in order to gear up for war. Also given that his massive purges didn't really help in the beginning, how responsible are his modernization policies for saving the Soviet Union by significantly aiding in the defeat of the Germans?
Are you frikin' kiding me?May I ask you where are you from?I see that your curent location isTaiwan.I'm asking to see if you experimented the "benefits" of comunism.Because to be entitle to ask a question like this you need to have the experience of the "socialist dream"
P.S. I lived the firs 10 years of my life in the "comunist paradise"
I think there's been a misunderstanding, my friend. I'm not making the case that stalinism is good nor am I talking about overall benefits and disadvantages of communism. I'm only talking about whether or not Stalin's decisions can be jusified and how responsible they were for his victory against the Germans in WW2.
Taiwan didn't really have communism. They just had "barbarian" natives, pirates, and foreign imperialists (Dutch, Spanish, and others) pretty much run the show since the 1600s (with very little central control from the Ming and Qing Dynasties), then the Japanese from 1895-late 1940s, then Chinese Nationalist Party rule with an iron grip until about the late 1980s, then democracy more or less.
cyrenius wrote:The killing 20mil people for an ideologi can't be justified
Sure it can. If 20 million people was the side affect of quickly modernizing, which in turn was crucial in preparing the Soviet Union to dfeat the Germans, then those 20 million deaths can be justified. It's morally wrong, but since Stalin's policies brought pretty much overnight (about a decade) a more modern industrialized heavy industry, then it's justified. No other method could have done so quickly. Of course, this method of Stalin's really created a lot of long-term problems, but in this small case of from the 1930s to 1945 ti seemed justified.
The alternative? Let's say Stalin didnt' aggressively persue his 5 Year Plans, didn't focus on heavy industry at the expense of the agricultural sector, then the Soviet Union would've most likely not have been as capable of producing much needed armaments to win the war. So, they would've most likely lost, and the consequences of that go in te realm of speculation. I'd say the western Allies would be shit out of luck in fighting off the Germans without the SU engaging about 75% of the Wehrmacht while US was invading. The Germans wuold've been able to defeat the Soviet Union much quicker as well, causing even more problems for the Western Allies.
So you can "justify" something "morally wrong" as I understand your last reply. Could you elaborate on some definitions of "justify" and "morally wrong" please - i find that really confusing.
xelabale wrote:So you can "justify" something "morally wrong" as I understand your last reply. Could you elaborate on some definitions of "justify" and "morally wrong" please - i find that really confusing.
thegreekdog wrote:Not necessary, probably hurt the Soviet Union more than it helped.
"In order to prepare for war, let's kill all our officers."
Stalin was a paranoid freak.
That being said, what happens if the Soviets have a counter-revolution before Germany invades?
Yeah buddy, Stalin was paranoid, and killing so many officers wasn't too good for morale, but that's just part of the package deal with Stalin. He quickly modernizes the country, kills millions of civilians, and then kills tens of thousands of officers--so it's not beneficial but it can't be separated from Stalin's package deal.
Leading up to the war against the Germans, it's justified. As for the long-run of things, it says a lot to see how poorly later Russian leaders viewed Stalin posthumously and his methods. And, his methods had a terrible affect on the civilians--on all Russians, for many years to come. I still think the Russians would've moved towards stronger planning without the help of Stalin, so either way the economy would've had the same problems.
If the Soviets had a counter-revolution, they probably would be so busy fighting a civil war that they couldn't concern themselves too much with the Germans... That would be disastrous. The Germans would even have the option of supplying the Russian National Socialists--or some group with a similar enough ideology to Germany's, and pit them against other elements in the Russian counter-revolution. However, if that counter-revolution was somehow as efficient and quick as Iran's Revolution in 1978, then they might have been able to hold back the Germans. But, the Iranian Revolution at first had much support from nearly all types of groups in Iran; whereas, a possible revolt in Russia from the early 1930s to especially the late 1930s seemed slim and didn't have enough one-sided support for the civil war to come to a quick enough conclusion in order to face the Germans.
If Stalin was assassinated earlier (1930, 1931), then things would have be been done differently, but as for modernizing Russia in time, I wouldn't think that to be possible without using Stalin's method.
I have yet to see any quicker and better method of modernizing a country than Stalin's method--given Russia's circumstances. The quickness of this modernization was crucial for the Soviet Union to defeat the Germans.
(I seriously wonder how they come up with such numbers). I remember a chart my History Professor drew a few years ago showing the Russia's industrial capacity or "strength" pretty much flatlining. He cited someone who's name I cannot recall. Would you happen to know anything about this?
) Sorry, I'm working on this one right now, please give me by tonight or by tomorrow or the next day.
XiGames
