Frigidus wrote:spaceghst44 wrote:jonesthecurl wrote:A very timely comment about markets working fine.
I hadn't noticed any problems had you?
I am not here to teach you basic economic principles, I get paid to do that and by doing it here I get no compensation.
That being said:
You obviously know nothing about markets.
Claiming markets do not work without a government presence by citing current market failure engulfed with government oversight is trite.
Recent economic failures are due to past and present government intervention.
Please do not comment with snide remarks on things you know nothing about, it only makes you look the fool.
Haha...nothing about economics, cute. All right, lets tear apart your theory.
Governments produce nothing positive that can not be privatized, hence forth, governments should not exist. markets work fine, we should use them.
The obvious problems with completely free markets aside (the unchecked and constantly growing division between rich and poor aside, something which generally leads to
true mob rule), there are plenty of things that can't be privatized. For example, a military. How, exactly, would you go about charging for military service? Let's say you're the protector of a city, but a member of that city refuses to pay for the service as he feels he can protect himself. You would still be protecting him, as he is surrounded by those that actually pay. What if half the city was like this? The only way to guarantee that it wouldn't be a losing venture would be to enforce payment by all individuals. Some would call this taxation, others extortion, I call it the foundations of government.
This doesn't even mention that without large governing bodies, war would become much more profitable. If you could overwhelm the company guarding a certain area, you would get everything. It's not like they would receive support from other companies, why help the competition?
Let's look at education: your system would essentially only educate the rich, removing the poor from any type of job that would require an education and leaving them permanently at the bottom of the pile. I somehow doubt they'd be thrilled with this.
These problems were around before systems of government were put in place. That is why they exist. You want to talk about knowing nothing about markets, let's look at the guy that's saying that an economy, simply by existing, solves all the problems that come with a ruling body.
That was the worst job of tearing apart any theory. You just stated ideas that were in your head without facts. I will point out why you are wrong, if you want my answers you will have to pay for them.
Military can be privatized, they exist today.
Free riders, as you are describing, is your claim to why free market military would not work. Well free riders exist in our current system. Think of all the people who don't pay taxes. You have the same problem on both sides of the coin. If half the city did not pay for protection, the city would be destroyed; hence they would pay for the protection. The same as why People still pay taxes and others who do not still get the same benefits as people who do. It is worth it to the payer to get the benefits and absorb the cost of the free rider.
You meant to say war is only profitable for governing bodies.
Let’s look at Education.
Rich people are the only ones educated now. (Public Schools vs. Private Schools). Not many kids from public schools get into Harvard huh?
If you want to get answers on your own, here a brief list of readings about free markets and how they solve the problems you have listed. Consider this my gift. Like I said if you want my answers you have to pay for them. I did list them by geographical locations for you so you could see how they have worked all over the world. Please come with facts not ideas.
Africa:
Leeson, Peter T. (forthcoming) "Trading with Bandits" Journal of Law and Economics. available at: peterleeson.com
The American Frontier:
Anderson, Terry and P.J. Hill (1979). "An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West," Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 3 No. 1 pp. 9 - 29. Available at:
www.mises.org.
Anderson, Terry and P.J. Hill (2004). The Not So Wild Wild West. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. For sale on Amazon.com.
Benson, Bruce L. (1991). "An Evolutionary Contractarian View of Primitive Law: The Institutions and Incentives Arising under Customary Indian Law," Review of Austrian Economics. Vol. 5 pp. 65 - 85. Available at
www.mises.org.
Amsterdam:
Stringham, Edward (2003). "The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam," Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. Vol. 43 No. 2 pp. 321 - 344. Available at: sjsu.edu.
China:
Friedman, David (2006). "From Imperial China to Cyberspace: Contracting Without the State," Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy. pp. 349 - 370. Available at: davidfriedman.com.
England:
Benson, Bruce L. (1998a). "Evolution of Commercial Law," in P. Newman (editor) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. London: Macmillan Press. For sale on Amazon.com.
Benson, Bruce L. (1998b). "Law Merchant," in P. Newman (editor) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. London: Macmillan Press. For sale on Amazon.com.
Benson, Bruce L. (1990). The Enterprise of Law, Justice without the State. San Francisco, CA: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, pp. 224 - 230. For sale on Amazon.com.
Europe:
Benson, Bruce (2002). "Justice without Government: The Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe and Their Modern Counterparts," printed in Beito, Gordon and Tabarrok (editors) The Voluntary City: Choice, Community and Civil Society. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute pp. 127 - 150. For sale on Amazon.com.
Davies, Stephen (2002). "The Private Provision of Police during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," printed in Beito, Gordon and Tabarrok (editors) The Voluntary City: Choice, Community and Civil Society. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute pp. 151 - 181. For sale on Amazon.com.
Greif, Avner (1989). "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," Journal of Economic History, pp. 857 - 882. Available on JSTOR.
Milgrom, Paul, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast (1990). "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagnes Fairs," Economics and Politics. pp. 1 - 23. Reprinted in Anarchy and the Law.
Iceland:
Friedman, David (1979). "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law - A Historical Case," Journal of Legal Studies. pp. 399 - 415. Available at davidfriedman.com.
Long, Roderick T. (1994). "The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland," Formulations. Available at: libertariannation.org.
The Indus Valley:
Thompson, Thomas J. (2006). "An Ancient Stateless Civilization: Bronze Age India and the State in History," The Independent Review. Vol. 10 pp. 365 - 384. Available at Independent.org.
Ireland:
Peden, Joseph R. (1977) " Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law," Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 1 No. 2 pp. 81 - 95. Available at
www.mises.org.
Mexico:
Clay, Karen (1997). "Trade without Law: Private Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations. pp. 202 - 231. Available at Ideas.
Scotland:
Leeson, Peter T. (unpublished) "Laws of Lawlessness." Available at peterleeson.com.
Somalia:
Coyne, Christopher J. (2006). "Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy," Foreign Policy Analysis. Vol. 2 pp. 343 - 360. Available at ccoyne.com.
Higgs, Robert (2004). Against Leviathan: Government Power and a Free Society. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute. pp. 374 - 376. For sale on Amazon.com.
Leeson, Peter T. (unpublished) "Better Off Stateless Somalia Before and After Government Collapse," Available at: peeterleeson.com.
Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford and Alex Nowrasteh (unpublished). "Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos of Improvement?" Independent Institute Working Paper Number 64. Available at independent.org.
Here is a list of Classics for you to read that will help you on your way, since you are obviously uneducated or miseducated.
Alchian, Armen and William Allen. Exchange and Production. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1983.
Alchian, Armen. "Costs and Outputs." in The Allocation of Economic Resources by Moses Abramovitz.
Alchian, Armen. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory." Journal of Political Economy. June (1950).
Bailey, Martin J. "The Marshallian Demand Curve." Journal of Political Economy. June (1954): 225-261.
Bator, Francis M. "Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization." American Economic Review. March (1957): 22-59.
Baumol, William J. Economic Theory and Operations Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
Becker, Gary. "Competition and Democracy." In Essence of Becker. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995.
Boulding, Kenneth E. A Reconstruction of Economics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950. Pages 3 - 38.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.
Buchanan, James. Cost and Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Chamberlain. Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Harvard University Press, 1962.
Coase, Ronald. "Nature of the Firm." Economica November (1937). Reprinted in AEA readings.
Coase, Ronald. "Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law & Economics. October (1960): 1-44.
Demsetz, Harold. "Do Competition and Monopolistic Competition Differ?" Journal of Political Economy. February (1959): 146-148.
Demsetz, Harold. "Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights." Journal of Law & Economics. October (1964).
Demsetz, Harold. "Toward a Theory of Property Rights." American Economic Review. May (1967): 347-359.
Dewey, Donald J. "Geometry of Capital and Interest." American Economic Review. March (1963): 134-139.
Fisher, Irving. Nature of Capital and Income. New York: AM Kelley, 1965
Fisher, Irving. Theory of Interest. Clifton, NJ: AM Kelley, 1974. Reserve
Friedman, Milton. "The Marshallian Demand Curve." Journal of Political Economy. December (1949): 463-495.
Friedman, Milton. "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
Hayek, Friedrich. "Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review. 35 (1945): 519-530.
Hicks, John Richard, Sir. Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
Hicks, John Richard, Sir. Theory of Wages. London: Macmillian, 1973. Source: One copy on 2 Hr Reserve
Hirshleifer, Jack and David Hirshleifer. Price Theory and Applications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1998.
Machlup, Fritz. "Problem of Verification in Economics." Southern Economic Journal. July (1955): 1-21.
Nagel, Ernest. "Assumptions in Economic Theory." American Economic Review. May (1963): 211-219.
Posner, Richard A. Economic Analysis of the Law. New York: Aspen Law and Business, 1998.
Smith, Adam. Wealth of Nations. Book I. London: J M Dent & Sons, 1910. Stigler, George J. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market." Journal of Political Economy. June (1951): 185-193.
Stigler, George J. "The Economics of Information." Journal of Political Economy. June (1961): 213-225.
Stigler, George J. "Theory of Oligopoly." Journal of Political Economy. February (1964). Source: Electronic Reserves (JSTOR Link)
Stigler, George J. and Gary S. Becker. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputantum." American Economic Review. March (1997): 76-90.
Vickrey. Microstatics. Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964. Source: One copy on 2 Hr Reserve; one copy on 1 Day Reserve
Viner, Jacob. "Cost Curves and Supply Curves." Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie. 3 (1931): 23-46. Source: Electronic Reserve (Adobe PDF)
Wiener. The Human Use of Human Beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950. Source: One copy on 2 Hr Reserve
Noticed I did not even need to use Adam Smith. Your ideas may come from a good place, but you mind has been twisted.